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Abstract
We propose a protocol for anonymous distribution of quantum information that can be used
to implement either channel with anonymous sender or channel with anonymous receiver. Our
protocol achieves anonymity and message secrecy with unconditional security. It uses classical
anonymous transfer. It tolerates disruption of the protocol, but the number of disrupters must be
limited by the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov bound. This bound can be exceeded provided a specific
entanglement distillation procedure will be used. A different version of the protocol tolerates any
number of disrupters, but is secure only when receiver does not actively cooperate with other
corrupted participants.
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1 Introduction
The amount of data transmitted via Internet or computer networks in general grew rapidly during last
decades and it is expected that even more data influencing everyday life and economy will flow this
way. On the other hand, computing and storage power of contemporary computers and improvement
of algorithms allow automatic processing of huge amount of data and thus also filtering and tracing
particular messages. These can be selected according to sender, receiver or even content. While the
content of a message can be secured using various methods of encryption, sometimes already the
existence of the message as well as the identity of its sender and recipient are sensitive information.
By following recipients of your messages one can determine a lot about your personal or professional
life.
As a reaction on such an abuse of computer networks a number of methods assuring user (i.e.
sender and/or receiver) anonymity were proposed. These methods include both computationally [1]
and unconditionally secure solutions [2, 3, 4, 5]. While the latter are usually less efficient, they are the
only way to ensure provable anonymity of sender and/or receiver. This establishes them as an important
part of modern cryptography and justifies the attention they have received during last twenty years.
It is slightly surprising that applications of these primitives go far beyond preserving anonymity of
communicating parties. Anonymous transfer protocols are known to have wide applications in design
of secure ballot elections [6], Byzantine agreement [7] or key distribution protocols [8] and are the key
ingredient of digital pseudosignatures [9].
In this paper we propose a protocol realizing anonymous transfer of quantum information, which
has equivalent importance for future quantum networks as preserving anonymity in classical networks.
Using anonymous transfer of classical information as a primitive1 it assures anonymity, secrecy of the
message and detection of disrupters (also tracelessness, see below).
Before continuing with explanation of our approach we would like to stress differences to the paper
[10], where authors independently proposed a number of ideas and techniques contained also in our
paper. Main results of the paper [10] are two protocols, one for anonymous transfer of classical infor-
mation and one for anonymous transfer of quantum information. The main motivation was to design
traceless2 protocols, while sacrificing security of the message and detection of disrupters. Also, authors
did not design the protocols from scratch neither based them on some well-established cryptographic
primitives. The initial assumption of these protocols is that participants share securely created and
distributed generalized GHZ state. Distribution of this state is an important part of our protocol,
where one can achieve security stronger that the one proposed in [10].
The paper [10] demonstrates that quantum information processing might offer resources allowing
anonymous transfer of classical information with security features not achievable by classical cryptog-
raphy. Recently, there were proposed also other quantum techniques [11, 12], which partly establish
anonymous transfer protocol for classical information. While these solutions achieve no security im-
provements in contrast to classical protocols, they propose alternative ways of founding anonymous
transfer on principles of quantum mechanics.
2 Terminology and definitions
2.1 General approach to multi-party cryptographic protocols
Before introducing anonymous transfer problem we will briefly recapitulate general approach to secure
multi-party computation, which is a nice and uniform way of modeling cryptographic protocols, espe-
cially adversaries. In what follows we will denote P the set of all participants of the protocol. The
main goal of multi-party cryptographic protocols is to ensure that honest participants achieve the goal
specified in the definition of the problem regardless of actions of dishonest participants.
In order to model that all malicious participants fully cooperate, we interpret the cheating in the
way that the (active) adversary is a participant not included in the set P who takes full control of some
1It means we use it as a blackbox. Note that composite protocol can be only as secure as its weakest part so the
security of the primitive may limit security of the composite protocol.
2Protocol is traceless if it remains secure (anonymous) even after all participants publish all random bits they used.
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subset C ⊂ P of participants3 of the protocol. He is completely controlling participants in the set C,
especially he has access to their internal memory, can read their inputs and controls their outputs.
This approach was introduced in context of composable security, see e.g. [13] and references included
therein.
In this approach we can distinguish active and passive adversaries. Passive adversary controls the
set of corrupted participants only in a limited way – he can read all their inputs, outputs and internal
information, but he cannot change behavior of corrupted participants. In this sense the protocol [10] is
secure against passive adversary. Active adversary has all abilities as the passive one, and, in addition,
he can change behavior of corrupted participants. Our protocol is safe against active adversary.
There also exists an alternative approach to model cheating in protocols. This approach is more
traditional and sometimes allows to explain more easily cheating objectives of groups of participants,
but it is less formal. Cheating objectives are usually specified by description of potential cooperating
sets (collusions) of malicious participants together with goals they are willing cooperate on.
In our paper we will use both approaches, we use the single adversary approach mainly to explain
generality of our adversary model while the collusion-based approach is used in concrete situations to
explain cheating objectives of single participants of collusions. The switching between both approaches
is easy and natural.
Finally, we would like to mention that in the setting of complex cryptographic protocols (e.g.
anonymous channels) we are not interested in adversary able to tamper with bipartite communication
channels, namely we require that he is not able to modify bipartite communication. It makes no harm
if he can read the communication, however, in quantum case authentication of a particular channel
implies also its encryption [15].
2.2 Definition of anonymous message transfer
The term anonymous transfer includes a whole range of different subproblems. In order to be consistent
we adopted the terminology introduced in [14]. In this subsection we will briefly review part of this
terminology necessary for our paper.
Anonymity of an object is the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects known as
the anonymity set. Anonymity set usually consists of parties able to perform a particular action we
are interested in. In our case it means that the sender (receiver) is not identifiable within a particular
set of potential senders (receivers).
The concept of unconditionally secure anonymity was introduced by Chaum [2] as the problem of
dining cryptographers and all solutions based on the technique introduced in this paper are denoted
as DC-nets. There is a number of different anonymous channels, we will consider primarily three basic
versions.
Anonymous broadcast was the original setting introduced in [2]. There are n participants in this
problem – n potential senders S = {Pi}ni=1 and one real anonymous sender S ∈ S. S has a message
msg and wants to broadcast it in the way that
• Everyone receives msg.
• When adversary corrupts some set of participants C ⊂ S, then the anonymity set4 of the sender
is SrC.
• No one (except sender) can disrupt5 the protocol without being detected.
In message transfer with anonymous sender (MTAS) there are n participants – (n − 1)
potential senders S = {Pi}n−1i=1 , one real anonymous sender S ∈ S and one publicly known receiver
R ∈ P = S ∪ {R}. S has a message msg and he wants to transmit it to R in the way that
• R receives msg.
3When adversary corrupts some set of participants, it models the practical situation when all members of this set of
participants are dishonest and are fully cooperating in order to compromise security of the protocol.
4This is quite strict, often the anonymity set might be smaller, however, this is precisely what is achievable classically
and what our protocol achieves.
5I.e. to behave in the way that he prevents correct execution of the protocol.
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• No one except S and R learns the message.
• When adversary corrupts some set of participants C ⊂ P, then the anonymity set of the sender
is SrC.
• No one (except S and R) can disrupt the protocol without being detected.
Message transfer with anonymous receiver (MTAR) is close to the previous problem. There
are n participants – (n−1) potential receivers R= {Pi}n−1i=1 , one anonymous receiver R ∈R and one
publicly known sender S∈P=R∪{S}. S has a message msg and he wants to transmit it to R in the
way that
• R receives msg.
• No one except S and R learns the message.
• When adversary corrupts some set of participants C ⊂ P, then the anonymity set of the receiver
is RrC.
• No one (except S and R) can disrupt the protocol without being detected.
All these primitives can be classically realized with unconditional security against active adversary
using solutions based on the dining cryptographer nets.
In this paper we propose protocol for MTAS of quantum information and in conclusion we show
how to easily modify it to realize MTAR of quantum information. Before proceeding to the design of
the protocol we will briefly discuss cheating objectives of participants of the protocol in the case of
MTAS.
The sender S is the completely trusted participant in this problem - he has no cheating objectives.
He knows all information, he has no reason to disrupt the protocol and also he has no reason to
wrongfully accuse some other participant of disruption – this will only decrease his anonymity set6.
R is not interested in disruption of the protocol with one exception - he might be interested to
disrupt the protocol provided that he can accuse other participant of disruption and exclude him from
the protocol. R also does not have to cheat in order to learn the message - he will learn it anyway. His
main goal remains to learn the identity of the sender S.
Other participants - potential senders - might be interested in a number of cheating objectives -
they want to learn the identity of S, they want to learn the message msg and they want to disrupt the
protocol.
3 Design of the Protocol and its Security
Let us first discuss reasonability of the initial assumption of [10]. In the case we do not consider
disrupters, this state can be easily created - it suffices that one randomly chosen participant creates
and distributes it. He is trusted to do because by distributing different state he does not compromise
anonymity of the sender and we suppose that participants are not interested in disruption of the
protocol. Once we consider possible disruption, this assumption starts to be problematic. In case of
anonymous channel for classical information it is not achievable, since existence of this state will imply
unbiased multipartite coin tossing, what is not possible [16] in presence of dishonest participants.
In case of anonymous transfer of quantum information the situation seems to be similar, but the
anonymous sender can act through classical anonymous channel to deliver trusted information to other
participants. It might be interesting to investigate whether this changes the situation, although it does
not seem to be probable.
The first idea of our protocol, proposed also by [10], is that S can easily transfer any quantum state
anonymously to R provided that S and R share an EPR pair, but R does not know who is controlling
the other system. To transfer a state ρˆ S simply teleports it using the EPR pair to R and sends him the
6Important is that once the sender is (possibly) changed, all participants previously excluded (because of disruption)
may join the protocol again. Otherwise sender may accuse honest participant of disruption to reduce anonymity set of
the next sender.
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result of the measurement using anonymous broadcast, as described in Protocol 1. To implement an
anonymous transmission of quantum information it remains to design a protocol achieving anonymous
sharing of an EPR pair.
Protocol 1 MTAS of quantum information
Participants: Potential senders S, publicly known receiver R, unknown sender S ∈ S
Input: quantum system M
Goal: S wants to send the state of M to R in the way that his identity remains secret.
Requires: anonymous broadcast of classical information, EPR pair |Φ+〉SR shared between S and R
such that the identity of S is unknown (even to R).
1: Sender S performs Bell measurement on the systems M and S and sends the outcome of the
measurement to R using anonymous message broadcast.
2: R uses this information to reconstruct the original state.
In order to explain the design and security proof of our protocol in a transparent way we will
introduce first highly simplified Protocol 2 capturing the basic principle of the Protocol 3. Protocol
2 in fact solves anonymous transfer of quantum information when we do not consider disrupters,
but instead of assuming initially shared generalized GHZ state it uses existing classical solution of
anonymous channel.
Protocol 2 Anonymous noisy EPR generation without disruption detection
Participants: Potential senders S = {Pi}n−1i=1 , publicly known receiver R, unknown sender S ∈ S
Goal: S wants to generate EPR pair(s) shared with R while staying anonymous.
Requires: MTAR of classical information, bipartite authenticated quantum channel between each
pair of participants
1: Each Pi ∈ S creates n qubit quantum system in the state |Φ〉 = 1√2 (|0〉
⊗n
+ |1〉⊗n), keeps one
subsystem and sends to each participant (including R) one of the remaining subsystems.
2: Each potential sender Pi (except S) measures all systems he is possessing in the basis {|+〉, |−〉}
and records the outcomes oi,j , j = 1 . . . n (each participant received n quantum systems). He sends
these results to S using MTAR.
3: S sends himself a dummy message (e.g. a random bit) using MTAR.
4: S = Pj′ repairs the state of each system he shares with R to the EPR pair |Φ+〉. To repair the
i–th system he applies σz to his system if ⊕n−1j=1 oj,i = 1 (we formally set oj′,i = 0).
The basic method of the generation of an EPR pair in Protocol 2 is based on a simple observation.
If we take an n–qubit generalized GHZ state |Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉⊗n + |1〉⊗n) and measure arbitrary (n− 2)
qubits independently in the dual basis
{
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)
}
, then the state of
two remaining qubits collapses, depending on results of the performed measurements, either to |Φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (if the number of outcomes |−〉 was even) or to |Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉−|11〉) (if the number of
outcomes |−〉 was odd). Sender receives outcomes of all measurements and hence he can easily repair
the state of the system SR to |φ+〉 by applying σz to his system when necessary (he counts the number
of outcomes |−〉).
Let us suppose that measurement outcomes are publicly broadcasted instead of being sent via
MTAR. In this case also the sender is forced to broadcast publicly outcome of his measurement. Since
the distributor of the state |Φ〉 is in principle interested in compromising anonymity of the sender, he
may create and distribute system of n qubits, where each of the qubits will be randomly in a state |+〉
or |−〉. Since sender does not perform measurement, he has chance 1/2 to be caught not measuring
the system and his identity will be revealed. It is not sufficient to send the measurement outcomes
securely to receiver, because he can cheat as well. The key obstacle is that it is insecure to suppose
that the original system is in the state |Φ〉 if it is created by someone else than the sender. Therefore
we use MTAR to send outcomes to S.
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The fact that quantum system in state |Φ〉 is created and distributed by each of the participants
will be used in Protocol 3 to lay traps to detect disrupters while preserving anonymity of the sender.
Theorem 3.1. Protocol 2 preserves anonymity of the sender and when participants do not disrupt it,
it creates n− 1 EPR pairs shared between public receiver and anonymous sender.
Proof. Behavior of the sender differs only in local actions he performs on his quantum systems, what
cannot be detected, and in the classical bit he sends in Step 4:, that is uncorrelated to the quantum
system he received. However, he is the only receiver of this information and hence his behavior is
indistinguishable from all other participants.
It is obvious that when other participants do not disrupt the protocol, it creates n− 1 EPR pairs
shared between public receiver and anonymous sender.
The disadvantage of Protocol 2 is that it is vulnerable even to a small amount of noise, which can
be introduced by a malicious participant. To prevent this we have to allow honest participant to detect
possible malicious behavior of other players on the state he distributed. This means we should provide
him a way how to verify that they indeed performed measurement in dual basis and submitted correct
outcome to the sender. In order to do this each player in each round of Protocol 3 randomly decides
whether he will operate in an actual or in a trap mode. In the trap mode he sends his trap states to
the sender who later verifies whether there was any disagreement with reported outcomes of particular
measurements. Note that this disagreement can be caused by both disruption and malicious behavior
of the trap layer, but this does not compromise security of the protocol.
Important is that if an honest trap state was distributed, malicious participants must either measure
it in the dual basis and submit correct outcome or there is a probability that they will be detected,
which is proportional to the amount of noise (strength of disruption) they introduce. This is formulated
in Lemma 3.2, which is proven in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.2. Let us suppose that quantum systems P1, . . . , Pn (controlled by a set of participants P)
are either in the generalized GHZ state 1/
√
2(|0n〉 + |1n〉) or in one of the states {|+〉, |−〉}⊗n. Let
us further suppose that there is some collusion C ⊂ P of corrupted participants controlling (WLOG)
quantum systems P1, . . . , Pm, m < n. Let us suppose that they perform some quantum operation that
distinguishes with good probability states {|+〉, |−〉}⊗m from each other. Provided this operation gave
outcome |φ〉 ∈ {|+〉, |−〉}⊗m, the state of unmeasured systems Pm+1, . . . , Pn is close to
TrC
( [|φ〉
C
〈φ| ⊗ 1ˆPrC
] |Φ〉
〈Φ| [|φ〉
C
〈φ| ⊗ 1ˆPrC
] |Φ〉
)
. (1)
When disagreement is detected, protocol is restarted and potential sender will simply ignore the
participant who was detected to disrupt his state and therefore this participant has no chance to
introduce errors. The list of participants each potential sender Pi distributes the generalized GHZ
state to is the set Pi. This is analogical to removing edge from the key sharing graph in [2].
Theorem 3.3. Protocol 3 preserves anonymity of sender and it with high probability generates at least
one (concrete number of EPR pairs depends on entanglement distillation settings) EPR pair shared
between anonymous sender and public receiver for each honest potential sender.
The last step of Protocol 3 allows three possible solutions with different security implications.
In Step 14 sender learns which of sets was distillable [17] and which was not. Important is that
receiver does not learn this and that is why entanglement distillation with one-way communication
must be used. The number of EPR pairs dishonest participants must disrupt grows with the number
of generated EPR pairs. On the other hand, the probability of detection of at least one disrupter
grows exponentially with the number of EPR pairs malicious participants disrupts and therefore we
can always guarantee reasonable amount of noise (that allows distillation) in the set of states which
was generated by an honest participant.
We can modify the protocol in the way that it is not necessary to restart it when disrupter is
detected. The only difference is that disrupters are able to introduce more noise than in the original
protocol, each eavesdropper must be considered independently and therefore possible undetected noise
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Protocol 3 Anonymous EPR generation
Participants: Potential senders S = {Pi}i, publicly known receiver R, unknown sender S ∈ S
Input: m – the number of rounds that should be executed, p - probability that potential sender decides
to switch to the trap mode
Goal: S wants to generate a number of EPR pairs shared with R in the way that his identity remains
anonymous.
Requires: MTAR of classical information, anonymous broadcast, bipartite authenticated quantum
channel between each pair of participants, public entanglement distillation protocol
1: Set all sets Pi = P.
2: repeat ⊲ Repeat m times
3: Each potential sender Pi (including S) decides whether he will operate in trap (probability p)
or actual (probability 1− p) mode and reports this to S using MTAR.
4: Each Pi operating in actual mode creates an |Pi| qubit quantum system in the state |Φ〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉⊗|Pi|+ |1〉⊗|Pi|), keeps one subsystem and sends to each participant in Pi (including R) one
of the remaining subsystems.
5: Each Pi operating in trap mode sends to each participant in Pi quantum system randomly in
state |+〉 or |−〉 and remembers states he sent.
6: Each potential sender Pi (except S) measures all systems he is possessing in the basis {|+〉, |−〉}
and records outcomes oi,j , j = 1 . . . n− 1 (each participant received n− 1 quantum systems). First
index refers to participant performing the measurement, second index identifies creator (distributor)
of the system. He sends these results to S using MTAR.
7: Sender measures all systems which were reported in Step 3: to be trap states.
8: Each potential sender operating in the trap mode sends to S using MTAR the list of trap states
he distributed.
9: S compares each received list with outcomes of measurements he obtained from participants
and publicly (using anonymous broadcast) announces any disagreement including disagreement in
his measurement.
10: If there was any disagreement, corresponding sets Pi are modified and protocol is restarted:
If there was a trap system distributed by participant Pi and incompatible measurement outcome
received from participant Pj , then Pj will be removed from Pi’s cooperation set, i.e. Pi ← Pir{Pj}.
11: S = Pj′ repairs the state of each system he shares with R and which was not reported to be
the trap state to the EPR pair |Φ+〉 (in case the system was not disrupted, otherwise the state is
random), i.e. to repair the i–th system he applies σz to his system if ⊕n−1j=1 oj,i = 1 (we formally
set oj′,i = 0).
12: Both S and R remember who created each particular EPR pair (more precisely - the original
state |Φ〉). Later, in Step 14:, they perform independently a test for purity of EPR pairs created
by each participant.
13: until executed m times
14: S and R perform entanglement distillation with one-way communication independently on each
set of all (possibly noisy) EPR pairs created by particular participant. They succeed with high
probability to distill EPR states created by each honest participant. Classical communication from
R to S is realized using MTAR.
15: Create anonymously shared EPR pair(s), see discussion following after Theorem 3.3.
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in each particular ensemble will be multiplied by the number of disrupters. This implies that the
number m of rounds must be increased appropriately. On the other hand, the fact that we do not have
to restart the protocol increases efficiency greatly, since disrupters might behave in the way that they
disrupt at the end of the protocol to increase time and communication complexity.
The key problem is the Step 15 : since sender and receiver must establish a number of pure EPR
pairs, but receiver should not be able to learn which set of original states was not distillable. In case
receiver can do so, he can in cooperation with other dishonest participants compromise anonymity of
the sender. It is sufficient that each dishonest participant introduces in the states he generates noise
affecting only one honest participant, e.g. he is sending him random particle and otherwise he behaves
correctly. In case such an ensemble of states is found not distillable in Step 14, it means that the only
disrupted participant was the sender and his identity is revealed.
In order to prevent this receiver must not learn which ensemble was noisy and which was not.
Possible solution to this is to take all states obtained in Step 14 regardless whether they emerged from
successful or insuccessful distillation and distill them together using some distillation procedure with
one-way communication. The number of errors is the number of system generated by disrupters. In case
we consider that we extracted one EPR pair for each participant, the number of disrupting participants
protocol can tolerate is bounded by the quantumGilbert-Varshamov bound which establishes the bound
for errors distillable with one-way communication [18]. A subject of future research will be to design
specific entanglement distillation procedure that uses the sender’s knowledge which states are pure and
which are noisy. This may allow to exceed the Gilbert-Varshamov bound.
Other possibility is to simply inform receiver in which cases the distillation succeeded. In this case
protocol works even in case there are only two nondisrupting potential senders, but it is secure only
provided that receiver does not cooperate in a malicious way with potential senders.
4 Conclusion
Protocol 3 is quite difficult to implement experimentally, however, for anonymous transfer without
disruption detection it is sufficient to use simplified version of Protocol 2, especially it is sufficient
that only one randomly chosen participant distributes the generalized GHZ state. Five participant
version of this protocol is (up to classical communication) exactly the experiment [19], although the
motivation of this experiment was different. Therefore the experiment [19] can be considered to be the
first experimental realization of simplified version of our anonymous transfer protocol.
It is possible to adapt Protocol 3 to tolerate certain amount of noise. All what has to be done is
that small fraction of incorrect answers won’t be considered to be disruption and parameters p and m
(optionally also distillation parameters) will be adjusted to increase probability of disrupter detection
and preserve the level of noise.
Due to no-cloning theorem and properties of authentication of quantum information [15] it is impos-
sible to simply modify the digital pseudosignatures proposed in [9] to work with quantum information.
There are two main reasons - from the no-cloning theorem we obtain that we must have a number of
identical copies of quantum state if we want to apply digital pseudosignatures. Even more fundamental
problem is the result of [15] that any authentication also encrypts quantum information and therefore
other participants have no chance to verify whether two different signatures correspond to the same
message.
As a conclusion we remark that it is possible to modify this protocol to realize MTAR of quantum
information. It suffices to invert the direction in which the message is being teleported at the end of
the protocol. Our approach can be also modified to assure simultaneous anonymity of the sender and
the receiver, but this beyond scope of this paper.
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A Proof of Lemma 3.2
In order to distinguish products of dual basis states corrupted participants have to perform some kind
of measurement on P1, . . . , Pm, which can be represented as a von Neumann measurement on some
larger system (i.e. together with some ancillas) P1, . . . , Pm, A1, . . . , Ak, where ancillary systems are
in some fixed pure state |a1〉. It is easy to see that this measurement is the most general operation
they can perform, since any unitary operation before measurement can be seen as a change of the
measurement projection operators.
Let us suppose that they perform measurement using projectors {Mi}i = and let {|bj〉}2k+mj=1 be all
eigenvectors of measurement projectors. We will express members of this basis as a superposition of
vectors from product basis {|+〉, |−〉}⊗m⊗{|ai〉}2ki=1, where {|ai〉}2
k
i=1 is a basis on the ancillary system
A1, . . . , Ak. Let us express
|bj〉 =
∑
i,l
αi,l,j |ψl〉 ⊗ |ai〉, (2)
where {|ψl〉}2ml=1 is some enumeration of the basis states {|+〉, |−〉}⊗m. The fact that the measurement
distinguishes products of dual basis states with good probability means that when there is a non-
negligible probability of obtaining projector M ∈ {Mi}i as an outcome, then this outcome must give
answer about original state of the system P1, . . . , Pm. It means M restricted on systems P1, . . . , Pm is
close to projector on some state |ψl〉 ∈ {|+〉, |−〉}⊗m. Otherwise M has eigenvector |bj〉 such that it
has nonnegligible coefficient
∑
i αi,l′,j in Eq. 2 corresponding to different basis states |ψl′〉 6= |ψl〉 and
therefore M might have been obtained even if the systems P1, . . . , Pm were in the state |ψl′〉.
This proves our statement since such a projector causes collapse of quantum systems Pm+1, . . . , Pn
close to collapse caused by independent measurements in the dual basis with outcome |ψl〉.
B Proof of Theorem 3.3
In order to prove sender’s anonymity we will analyze all steps where his behavior differs from behavior
of other potential senders. In Step 6 : the sender does not measure state he received, but this is only
local operation which cannot be detected. He measures all systems that were reported to be in one of
the trap states. In Step 9 : he reports all disagreements in states that were in advance reported to be
trap states. He also announces optional disagreement in his measurement (although this implies that
the distributor of the trap states was lying), but he measured trap states as all other honest potential
senders and therefore his anonymity is not threatened.
In Step 11 : the sender performs only local operations on his quantum systems what cannot be
detected. In Step 14 : the sender cooperates with the receiver on distillation of the shared EPR
pairs. The sender is receiving classical communication through MTAR and performing local quantum
operations and therefore his anonymity is not compromised. Analysis and discussion of Step 15 : is in
paragraphs following after Theorem 3.3.
To prove that each ensemble of EPR states originating from generalized GHZ state distributed by
an honest participant is distillable we have to prove that the amount of noise disrupters can introduce
into such an ensemble is below distillable threshold. In fact, we will show that at the cost of efficiency
we can guarantee with arbitrarily high probability arbitrarily small amount7 of noise in all ensembles
generated by honest participants.
Let p be the probability that honest participant decides to operate in a trap mode, (n − 1) the
number of rounds of Protocol 3, θ the fraction of error repairable by the chosen entanglement distillation
procedure (distillation succeeds if the number of errors in a group of r systems will be lower that θr)
and ξ the probability that disrupter of the quantum system8 guesses the trap state incorrectly.
Let us suppose that there is a collusion of disrupters disrupting generalized GHZ states distributed
by a particular honest potential sender. In order to prevent distillation of this ensemble they have
to disrupt θm(1 − p) systems (since on average only (1 − p)m rounds are in actual mode). When
7By amount of noise we mean the ratio between disrupted and pure EPR pairs in the ensemble.
8We consider here maximal disruption, i.e. operation introducing maximal error in distillation procedure. Smaller
error will allow better information about the trap state, but also causes smaller disruption, see Lemma 3.2
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disrupting a particular system there is a probability pξ that disrupter will be detected. Probability
that θm(1 − p) disruptions remain undetected is
Prob(disr) = (1− pξ)θm(1−p),
i.e. the it decreases exponentially with m. Therefore we can choose arbitrary Prob(disr) and θ and
then choose sufficiently large
m ≥ log1−pξ Prob(disr)
θ(1− p) .
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